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jurisdiction is sought be one which could have been brought as a
counterclaim in the original action had the original action been
brought in the supreme court. Since only a defendant can counterclaim,7 2 it is logical to conclude that CPLR 303 should be available
73
only to a defendant.
In Green, the party seeking to take advantage of CPLR 303 was
the plaintiff in the primary action. Harlowe's counterclaim was asserted not against him, but rather against Bender; hence, the primary plaintiff should not be considered a defendant within the context of CPLR 303. Moreover, since a Dole claim has generally been
considered a defense rather than the commencement of an action,
it would seem that even Bender could not have utilized CPLR 303
to secure in personam jurisdiction over Harlowe.74
Finally, it should also be noted that the counterclaim interposed by Harlowe was superfluous. Bender had already introduced
the apportionment issue by impleading Harlowe, and the latter's
counterclaim added nothing to the action. In all probability, Harlowe, who could not actually benefit by the interposition of a Dole
counterclaim, did so in conformity with his insurer's pro forma practice.7 5
In conclusion, while it is clear that Justice Gagliardi reached
the correct result in Green, it is submitted that the court's inquiry
into CPLR 303 should have revealed that, by its terms, this statute
was intended to be utilized not by a plaintiff in the primary action,
but instead, only by a defendant.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

Court of Appeals reaffirms vitality of Donovan-Arthur rule.
Stemming from a long line of New York decisions, the
Donovan-Arthur rule requires suppression of any statements elicited from a criminal defendant in the absence of his retained or
assigned counsel unless the defendant has first waived his rights in
the presence of his attorney.76 Although it was originally held to be
72 See CPLR 3019(a).

See CPLR 303, commentary at 156-57 (McKinney 1972).
11See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
75Indeed, had the court ruled in favor of Green and held that Harlowe waived his
jurisdictional defenses by counterclaiming, it is quite possible that Harlowe would have had
a claim against his insurer "for its counsel's zealousness in exposing the insured to personal
liability." 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
78 The Donovan-Arthur rule was developed in a line of cases that predated the Supreme
Court decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
13
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mandated by the New York State Constitution," later decisions
created several exceptions to the rule,7" and in 1970 the Court of
Appeals actually characterized it as "merely a theoretical statement of the law."79 With its constitutional basis in doubt, consider478 (1964). See generally Paulsen, The Winds of Change: Criminal Procedurein New York
1941-1965, 15 BUFFALO L. REv.297 (1966). An early case recognizing the importance of effective representation of a criminal defendant was People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d
825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960), discussed in 35 ALB. L. REV. 798, 800 (1971); 51 CORNELL L.Q.
356, 360 (1966). In Di Biasi, the Court held that statements made in the absence of retained
counsel by a defendant who had been indicted for a capital crime were inadmissable in
evidence. Shortly after Di Biasi, the same rule was applied to a defendant in a noncapital
case who was unrepresented by counsel. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445,
216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). The Waterman Court additionally held that since an indictment
represents the formal commencement of a criminal action, the defendant's right to counsel
attaches at that point. Id. at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 447-48, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75.
Extension of the right to counsel to the preindictment stage of the proceeding came in
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). In Donovan,
the Court suppressed the confession of a defendant whose lawyer was denied access to him
at the preindictment stage of the proceedings, holding that such denial violated both the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Id. at 151-52, 193 N.E.2d at 629,
243 N.Y.S.2d at 843. Following Donovan, uncertainty existed as to the exact limits of the rule,
especially since it was unknown whether a defendant would have to request counsel before
the right would attach. See Note, Escobedo in New York, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 51, 55-59
(1965). After the decisions in People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1965), and People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 533, 265 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1965),
however, this uncertainty no longer existed. Gunner and Friedlanderindicate that it is not
necessary that the defendant actually be denied access to counsel, nor that he specifically
request to see his attorney for the rule to apply.
The final step in the evolution of the right to counsel in the precommencement stage of
a New York criminal action was taken in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537,
292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968). The Court in Arthur held that once the defendant's attorney enters
the proceeding, the police may no longer question the defendant irrespective of whether he
requested the attorney or even knows of his presence. Such questioning is permitted only if
the defendant first waives his rights in the presence of the attorney. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d
at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Thus, it is clear that the Donovan-Arthurrule applies to assigned
as well as retained counsel, and is applicable even when counsel fails to request the police to
refrain from questioning the defendant. Finally, the rule has been held to be entitled to
retroactive recognition. People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 542, 245 N.E.2d 688, 696, 297
N.Y.S.2d 913, 924 (1969). It should be noted, however, that the rule is not without exceptions.
See note 94 infra. See generally W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 545 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973)
[hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON].
11 See People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 328-30, 239 N.E.2d 537, 538-39, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663,
665-67 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841,
843 (1963). The constitutional provisions held to mandate the Donovan-Arthur rule are the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and those rights arising from the due
process clause of N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
"I See People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 139, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969); People v.
McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969). For a discussion of Kaye and
McKie, see note 94 infra.
11People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971).
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able uncertainty developed as to the continued viablity of the rule.'"
Recently, however, the Court of Appeals, in People v. Hobson,,'
reaffirmed the continued existence of the Donovan-Arthur rule, declaring that "[a]ny statements elicited [from a defendant] . . . .
after a purported 'waiver' obtained without the presence or assis82
tance of counsel, are inadmissible.
Hobson presented the Court with an opportunity to reconsider
the rule in a classical Donovan-Arthur setting. Defendant Hobson
had been photograph-identified as the perpetrator of a robbery in
Suffolk County. Several months later, while being held on unrelated
charges, he was placed in a lineup for identification as the robbery
suspect. Defendant's assigned counsel 83 was present at the lineup,
but left shortly after Hobson was identified. Following his attorney's
departure, defendant signed a waiver form and agreed to speak to
the police. Although the detective involved knew that Hobson was
represented by counsel, he made no effort to contact the attorney
before commencing an interrogation that elicited inculpatory statements from Hobson. 4 Before trial, Hobson unsuccessfully moved to
suppress these statements. He was subsequently convicted, upon a
plea of guilty, of robbery in the third degree.85
The Court of Appeals held that Hobson's confession should
have been suppressed, 6 thus reaffirming the continued viability of
the Donovan-Arthur rule. In reaching this result, the Court overruled two cases often viewed as departures from the DonovanArthur rule-People v. Robles87 and People v. Lopez.8 The Hobson
1oSee People v. Pellicano, 40 App. Div. 2d 169, 338 N.Y.S.2d 831 (4th Dep't 1972)
(divided appellate division refused to apply the Donovan-Arthurrule). A noted commentator
also expressed uncertainty as to the status of the rule following the Robles decision. See
RICHARDSON, supra note 76, § 545, at 547-48.
?
-139 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976), rev'g 47 App. Div. 2d 716,
336 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
82 Id. at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
Significantly, counsel had been assigned to defendant for the robbery charge. Had the
attorney been assigned solely to represent defendant on the unrelated charges, the DonovanArthur rule would not have barred admission of the statements concerning the robbery. See,
e.g., People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971). But see People
v. Ramos, No. 461 (N.Y. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1976).
39 N.Y.2d at 482-83, 348 N.E.2d at 896-97, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
Id. at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The conviction was affirmed by
the appellate division. 47 App. Div. 2d at 716, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
86 39 N.Y.2d at 491, 348 N.E.2d at 903, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
87 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945
(1971).
- 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971).
The Hobson Court also overruled People v. Wooden, 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436, 338
N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972) (mem.), a case which merely followed the Lopez holding.
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Court, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Breitel, declared that
both Robles and Lopez represented a sudden, unexplained retreat
from an established and well-reasoned line of authority. 9 Noting
that the purpose of the rule is to provide an "effective safeguard
against an involuntary waiver of counsel"9 by a person in the grips
of the state's coercive police power, the Hobson Court declared that
neither Robles nor Lopez provided a convincing rationale for vitiating the rule. 9' These considerations led the Court to conclude that
the doctrine of stare decisis did not require adherence to the two
decisions.9"
Undoubtedly, Robles was a bar to application of the DonovanArthur rule. In Robles, defendant's attorney asked the police to
"watch" the defendant while he left the room. In answer to a question posed to him during his lawyer's absence by an acquaintance
on the police force, defendant admitted to murdering two people.
At no time during the subsequent interrogation did the police secure
a waiver of defendant's rights in the presence of his lawyer or even
inform defendant's attorney of the questioning.9 3 Allowing Robles'
statement to be admitted in evidence, the Court of Appeals held,
without elaboration, that the Donovan-Arthur rule was a mere theoretical statement and not a basic rule of law.94 The rule, said the
Robles Court, "is not applicable unless there is evidence of conduct
. . . which would indicate an intention to victimize a defendant or
39 N.Y.2d at 486-88, 348 N.E.2d at 899-901, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423-25.
Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
" Id. at 485-87, 348 N.E.2d at 898-900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
92 Commenting on its abandonment of the Robles and Lopez decisions,
the Hobson
Court noted that adherence to precedent is particularly important when property and contract rights are involved since the public continually relies on the stability of the law in those
areas. The absence of day-to-day reliance on the stability of constitutional law, combined
with the necessity of correcting errors in constitutional interpretation, requires less reliance
upon stare decisis in reassessing constitutional precedents, especially those involving individual rights. Id. at 488-89, 348 N.E.2d at 901-02, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26.
See 27 N.Y.2d at 157-58, 263 N.E.2d at 304-05, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95.
" Id. at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795. In so describing the DonovanArthur rule, the Robles Court relied on People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969), and People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534
(1969). Examination of these two cases reveals that the Court's reliance on them in Robles is
questionable. Both Kaye and McKie merely represent exceptions to the Donovan-Arthurrule,
see RICHARDSON, supra note 76, § 545, at 547, and are not at all inconsistent with the rule
itself. The Kaye exception provides that a spontaneous statement made by the defendant,
not elicited by questioning, is admissible in evidence notwithstanding failure to comply with
Donovan-Arthur requirements. 25 N.Y.2d at 143-44, 250 N.E.2d at 331-32, 303 N.Y.S.2d at
44-46. In McKie, the Court declared that the Donovan-Arthur rule does not apply to statements made while not in custody. 25 N.Y.2d at 26-28, 250 N.E.2d at 39-41, 302 N.Y.S.2d at
539-40.
'
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outwit his attorney in order to carry on an inquiry.",, Clearly, the
Robles Court drastically limited, if indeed it did not completely
abrogate the rule.
It is submitted, however, that Lopez was not a barrier to reaffirmation of the Donovan-Arthur rule by the Hobson Court. The Court
in Lopez held that a postindictment waiver of counsel by a defendant not represented by an attorney may be effectuated without
having any lawyer present." In contrast, the Donovan-Arthur rule
is applicable only when the defendant is represented by counsel. "
Thus, since Lopez actually did not involve a Donovan-Arthur
situation, it was unnecessary for the Hobson Court to have overruled that decision. 8 Quite possibly, by overruling Lopez the Court
is indicating that any statements elicited from a defendant during
the "critical stages" 9 of the proceeding must be taken either in the
presence of counsel or pursuant to a waiver entered into with the
advice of counsel. If so, this rule presumably would be applicable
regardless of whether the defendant is in fact represented by counsel
during the critical stages. 0
27 N.Y.2d at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
28 N.Y.2d at 25-26, 268 N.E.2d at 628-29, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27.
'7 See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Gabrielli, concurring in the Hobson result, opined that the overruling of Lopez
was unnecessary and improper. 39 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 348 N.E.2d at 903, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 427
(Gabrielli, J., concurring).
11 The United States Supreme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), indicated
that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the "critical stage" of the criminal
proceeding. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-23 (1975). Under New York law, the
critical stage of a criminal proceeding "begins with the filing of an 'accusatory instrument'
...
" People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890
(1974); People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173-74, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 92930 (1974). An accusatory instrument is defined as "an indictment, an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information, a superior court information, a misdemeanor
complaint or a felony complaint." CPL § 1.20(1).
11 Although the Hobson majority did not discuss the effect of overruling Lopez, Judge
Gabrielli, in his concurring opinion, recognized that with Lopez overruled an unrepresented
postcritical stage defendant may not waive his rights unless an attorney is present. See 39
N.Y.2d at 491-92, 348 N.E.2d at 903-04, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
Buttressing this interpretation of Hobson is the recent decision of the supreme court in People
v. Reyes, 176 N.Y.L.J. 96, Nov. 18, 1976, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). There, Justice
Coon, citing Hobson, held that once judicial proceedings have begun, even an unrepresented
defendant may only waive his right to counsel in the presence of a lawyer. Id., col. 6. Moreover, this result would seem to be indicated by careful comparison of then Judge Breitel's
dissent in Lopez with his opinion in Hobson. The Lopez dissent indicated that a postindictment, unrepresented defendant "is entitled to the advice of a lawyer and that the right may
not be waived except in the presence and with the acquiescence of counsel." 28 N.Y.2d at
26, 268 N.E.2d at 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (Breitel, J., dissenting). The Lopez dissent further
maintained that to permit a waiver of counsel by an unrepresented defendant during the
postindictment stage of the proceeding might be less "egregious [thani where counsel is
's
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Notwithstanding the questions created by the overruling of
Lopez, it is submitted that the Hobson Court reached the correct
result in reaffirming the Donovan-Arthurrule. The Court's analysis
revealed that the doctrine of stare decisis does not compel a court
to mechanically follow the latest relevant decision, but dictates instead that a court should be guided by "precedents which reflect
principle and doctrine rationally evolved."1 ° Moreover, the overruling of Robles and concomitant reaffirmation of the Donovan-Arthur
rule ensures, at the very least, that any waiver of protected constitutional rights by a represented criminal defendant will be knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.10 2 Without such a safeguard, a
defendant may unwittingly be deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel.103 In the final analysis, Hobson is a reaffirmation of the
already retained or assigned, but the frustration of the right may be as grave if the waiver
comes on the very eve of the inevitable retainer or assignment of counsel . . . ... Id. at 29,
268 N.E.2d at 631, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 830. Although Lopez involved a postindictment situation,
Judge Breitel's reasoning would appear to be applicable to any defendant during the critical
stages. See id. at 28-29, 268 N.E.2d at 631, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 829-30.
Interestingly, it was the reasoning of the Lopez dissenters that District Judge Frankel
adopted in granting the defendant's petition for habeas corpus relief. See United States ex
rel. Lopez v. Zelker, 344 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972). A close reading of Judge Frankel's opinion reveals
that the district court accepted; as a matter of federal constitutional law, the argument that
a waiver of the right to counsel after indictment, if permissible at all, can only be made in
the presence of counsel. See 344 F. Supp. at 1054.
01 39 N.Y.2d at 487-88, 348 N.E.2d at 900-01, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25. Stare decisis has
never been regarded as an absolute doctrine by the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Simonson v.
Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 3, 261 N.E.2d 246, 247, 313 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (1970); Woods v. Lancet, 303
N.Y. 349, 354-55, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951). In the past the Court has discarded previously
established rules of law when reason and justice so required. See, e.g., Silver v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972)(overruling proscription
against applying doctrine of forum non conveniens when one party is New York resident);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969)(abrogating
intrafamily tort immunity for nonwillful torts).
"I2See 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. Not treated by the
Hobson Court, however, were the protections to be afforded to the unrepresented criminal
defendant prior to the onset of the critical stage.
I See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330,
344 & n.19 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting). Ensuring against an involuntary waiver of the right
to counsel is but one purpose of the Donovan-Arthurrule; another important function of the
rule is to effectuate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See note 77 supra.
The need for such a rule to accomplish these goals is premised on the theory that the average
individual, untrained in law, may unwittingly surrender his rights when confronted with the
coercive power of the state. As the Hobson Court noted, while Miranda warnings may be of
some assistance to the defendant,
[t]hese warnings often provide only a feeble opportunity to obtain a lawyer, because the suspect or accused is required to determine his need, unadvised by anyone
who has his interests at heart. The danger is not only the risk of unwise waivers of
the privilege against self incrimination. . .but the more significant risk of inaccur-
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Court of Appeals' liberal interpretation of the right
privilege against self-incrimination provisions of
State constitution. It is hoped that this laudable
guarding these rights will continue to be vigorously
judiciary of this state.
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to counsel and
the New York
policy of safeapplied by the

GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e: Legislature liberalizes notice of claim
requirements.
Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law requires that in any
tort action against a public corporation in which a notice of claim
must be served upon the corporation as a condition precedent to
commencement of the action, such notice must be served within 90
days after the claim arises.' 4 In apparent response to repeated judicial criticism,' 5 the legislature recently amended section 50-e,'15
mitigating the harshness of some of its more stringent provisions.'0
Prior to the amendment, a claimant's slight departure from the
strict prescriptions mandated by this section often enabled a municate, sometimes false, and inevitably incomplete descriptions of the events described.
39 N.Y.2d at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
'0, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
"I As long ago as 1952, the Court of Appeals, in Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y.
440, 108 N.E.2d 397 (1952), acknowledged the inequities which can result from a literal
enforcement of § 50-e. In Teresta, the Court deemed the City to have waived the notice of
claim requirement when it had examined the plaintiff for his alleged injuries and yet failed
to object to lack of notice until the eve of trial. Construing the section liberally, the Court
noted that the statute should not be applied as "'a trap to catch the unwary or the ignorant.'" Id. at 443, 108 N.E.2d at 398, quoting Sweeney v. City of New York, 225 N.Y. 271,
273, 122 N.E. 243, 244 (1919). More recently, in Murray v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 113,
282 N.E.2d 103, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1972), Judge Breitel, in articulating his concern with the
harsh effects of § 50-e, stated:
Except to the practitioner who is skilled in tort cases or claims against municipalities, it is a mousetrap. Such a statute should provide a greater discretion to give
relief from its requirements and, of course, to avoid obvious abuses, set forth the
standards for the exercise of that greater discretion . ..
There should be prompt legislative correction of the statute.
Id. at 121, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (Breitel, J., concurring). See also Camarella
v. East Irondequoit Cent. School Bd., 34 N.Y.2d 139, 313 N.E.2d 29, 356 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1974)
(mem.); Sherman v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 36 N.Y.2d 776, 777, 329 N.E.2d 673, 673,
368 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1975) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
,0 Ch. 745, § 2, [1976] N.Y. Laws 1523 (McKinney).
For an in-depth analysis of § 50-e, see Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes, to be published in JUDICIAL
CONFEPNcE, TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT

(1976). Professor Graziano's report was submit-

ted to the legislature by the Judicial Conference and provided the basis for the amendments
to § 50-e.

